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iiTATHrMLNT ill »JUR 1 SDIC'I ION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (1953) §78-2-2.3(j) .

The Court of

Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to assignment from the Supreme
Court.

Utah Code Annotated (1953) §78-2a-2(k).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD i)v w'v V i M'W
Issues:
A.

Whether the trial court properly held that no reasonable

person could find for the Plaintiffs on their claims for Wrongful
Detention, Assault, Battery, False Imprisonment, Intentional and
Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Invasion of Privacy,
where the defendants had required the plaintiffs and some thirtyfive co-workers to leave their normal work stations, congregate in
the company lunch area, some thirty feet from the nearest door, wait
there for a period exceeding one hour, until each employee had been
taken individually to a company restroom and physically searched for
an allegedly stolen twenty dollar bill.
B.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law

that because Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence of damages of
monetary or emotional damages, Defendants were entitled to Summary
Judgment, where 1) the Plaintiffs had submitted their own and the
affidavits of family members as evidence of actual emotional
damages, as well as 2) the Report of one Expert Witness and the
Affidavit of another, and where 3) the causes of action alleged were
1

for the intentional torts of wrongful detention, assault, battery,
false

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress

and invasion of privacy.
Standard of Review:
The Motion for Summary Judgment is based on law, and presents a
question of law, and as such should be accorded no particular
deference, but be reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Summary Judgment is only proper when

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The determination of

whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment is a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness.
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991).

Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
The appellate court is

completely free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038-1039, (Utah
1989).

Furthermore, in determining a Motion for Summary Judgment,

the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the party opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Smith v.

Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

This is a case in tort. There are multiple

causes of action by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defendants.
The causes of action include claims for the intentional torts of
wrongful detention, assault, battery, false imprisonment,

2

intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as claims for
reckless infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.
Course of Proceedings: Plaintiffs filed this case in the Fourth
District Court of Utah in October 1993, and asked for a jury trial.
Defendants were served in January 1994. Defendants filed an answer.
The parties began discovery.

In July 1994 Defendant Lynton filed a

Motion for Partial Summary Judgement requesting that she be found
not personally liable.

The Motion was briefed and argued, and the

Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd Park presiding, granted Lynton's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed her from the case in
August 1994. Discovery continued.

In October 1994 Defendants filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims.
briefed and argued.

This Motion was

At oral argument on this matter on February 10,

1995, the trial court requested that the Plaintiffs submit
additional evidence of damages, and gave them thirty days to submit
this additional proof.

The trial court also gave the Defendants a

reasonable amount of time to respond to the additional evidence. As
requested by the trial court, the Plaintiffs prepared and submitted
additional proof of damages.
After filing their response to Plaintiffs7 Second Objection,
Defendants also filed a Motion to Suppress the Plaintiffs'
Affidavits.

Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this Motion.

On May

22, 1995 the trial court issued a twelve page Memorandum Decision
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts. The
trial court specifically chose not to rule on the Defendants' Motion
to Suppress.

Counsel for the Defendants summarized the trial

courts' Memorandum Decision into a three page Order.
court signed that order on July 14, 1995.

The trial

The Plaintiffs filed

their timely Notice of Appeal in the trial court on Monday, August
14, 1995.
Disposition:

The trial court granted both Defendant Lynton's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The trial court issued a twelve page Memorandum

Decision on the second Motion for Summary Judgment, with the order
that the Defendants prepare an Order consistent with the Memorandum.

Statement of Facts: Defendants did not submit any factual
evidence of their own in support of their second Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Therefore, the following facts are unchallenged and, as

the statement of facts by the party in opposition to Summary
Judgment must be taken as true for the purposes of this Appeal.
This statement of the undisputed material facts is based on the
Plaintiffs' Deposition testimony and three distinct sections of the
Record. These sections are the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Record
pp. 107-99; the Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Opposition to the
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Record pp. 397-344;
and the Amended English Translations of these Affidavits, Record,
pp. 457-420.
1.

In August 1992 the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures acted to
establish a production facility in Orem, Utah for the purpose
of manufacturing and selling novelty rubber stamps.

4

2.

Plaintiffs were all employed as workers in this facility for
varying periods of time between August and December of 1992.
None of the Plaintiffs remained as employees of the facility
past December 31, 1992.

3.

The language used on the factory floor was Spanish, and the
vast majority of factory employees, including the factory
manager, were Hispanic.

4.

Miguelangel Esquivel (Esquivel), the factory manager, had a
demonstrated pattern of verbally demeaning the factory workers
with invasive and harassing statements and accusations, such as
the following: "You are a bunch of thieves, robbers,
ungratefuls; you are talebearers because you speak badly of the
company;" [You don't] pay [y]our tithing, and because of this
things [go] badly in the company; [You are] wetbacks, and if
immigration came they would take [you] all away; [I am] sick of
people's gossip, and that [you are] a bunch of scandlemongers.

5.

Esquivel habitually told the plaintiffs and other factory
workers that they were a bunch of thieves, that he knew that
they were stealing the stamps.

He also told them that he had

been endowed with the authority that the company president and
sole officer, Mrs. Jeanette Lynton, had granted him to do
whatever he wanted with the employees.

Basing himself on the

fact that many of the employees were members of the Mormon
Church, he would tell the employees that they needed to pay
their tithing to continue working.

He also threatened them by

saying that if he dismissed them from their jobs, they would
5

have to go to ask help from their bishops to provide food for
themselves and their families.
Esquivel would say things to the factory workers such as "I am
certain that you don't pay your tithing.
things go badly for you."

I know that's why

He would also say "I am certain that

you are a bunch of hypocrites.

To my face you smile at me, but

behind my back you tell tales of me, I am certain."

He would

accuse them of not being able to enter the temple of the
church.

He would accuse them of being wetbacks and say that he

knew who the illegals were.
On at least one occasion Esquivel asked in an employment
interview to see the applicant's LDS temple recommend as a
purported qualification for the job.
However, on or around December 17, 1992, Esquivel went beyond
harrassing words.

On that day he gathered the approximately

forty factory workers into the cafeteria area of the factory
and informed them that, although he knew it was illegal, he had
had enough, and was going to require them to submit to a person
by person private search of their persons and belongings
because a co-employee reportedly complained that someone had
stolen twenty dollars from her.
Esquivel further stated that if anyone wanted to object, he
could raise his hand, and everyone would then know who the
thief was.
Each of the Plaintiffs was required to enter the applicable
rest room with their supervisor and submit to a search of their

persons and belongings.

The male supervisor was minimally

invasive in his search, only requiring the men to turn out
their pockets and open their wallets and lunch bags.

However,

the male supervisor did search the wallets.
11.

The female supervisor, on the other hand, required the women to
pull their blouses out of their pants or skirts and undo their
bras, after which she ran her hands around their mid-riffs
under their blouses.

The female supervisor also picked through

the women's hair with a pencil.
12.

All Plaintiffs were laid off as employees of the company prior
to January 1, 1993.

13.

In January 1993 Defendant DOTS formally registered as a foreign
corporation doing business in Utah.

14.

In October 1993 the Plaintiffs in this matter filed suit for
the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
wrongful detention, intentional and reckless infliction of
emotional distress and various counts of invasion of privacy.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting the Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment on all counts.

The trial court erred in ruling, as

a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the
Plaintiffs, on any of their causes of action, on the uncontested
facts.

The trial court also erred on both factual and legal grounds

in ruling that Plaintiffs had failed to establish proof of damages
sufficient to permit a jury to find in their favor at trial.

7

Because, according to the trial court, this was the case, there was
no point in permitting this case to go to the jury.
This is the first issue the Plaintiffs will address herein.

In

reviewing and arguing this determination, Plaintiffs will examine
the law applicable to each of their causes of action, the trial
court's legal findings on each cause of action, and the facts that
serve as the basis for Plaintiffs' contention that a jury could
reasonably find in their favor.

Because the undisputed facts in the

record would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the
Plaintiffs on each of their causes of action, the trial court's
ruling must be reversed, and this case must be remanded for further
proceedings.
The second issue on appeal pertains to the trial court's ruling
as a factual matter that Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence of
damages, and thus had no cause of action.
court erred both factually and legally.

On this point the trial

Plaintiffs did provide

undisputed, legally admissible evidence of actual damages.

The

trial court erred when it in part ignored and in part ruled
inadmissable Plaintiffs' evidence regarding their damages.
Furthermore, in requiring Plaintiffs to submit proof of actual
damages in order to prevail at Summary Judgment, the trial court
ignored the availability under the law of both nominal and general
damages in every one of Plaintiffs' causes of action.
The undisputed facts of this case are subject to multiple
interpretations regarding the reasonableness and meaning of the
actions of the parties.
8

Therefore, the trial court erred in

substituting its own judgment for that of a jury.

Furthermore,

despite the trial court's ruling to the contrary, the Plaintiffs
submitted legally admissible evidence of actual damages more than
sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact.

Finally,

the trial court applied the wrong legal standard of damages in
refusing to allow general or nominal damages in cases of intentional
tort.

For each of these reasons, the trial court's ruling in this

case must be reversed and remanded for trial.
ARGUMENT
Issue I. Whether the trial court properly held that no
reasonable person could find for the Plaintiffs on their claims
for Wrongful Detention, Assault, Battery/ False Imprisonment,
Intentional and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
Invasion of Privacy/ where the defendants had required the
plaintiffs and some thirty-five co-workers to leave their
normal work stations, congregate in the company lunch area,
some thirty feet from the nearest door, wait there for a period
exceeding one hour, until each employee had been taken
individually to a company restroom and physically searched for
an allegedly stolen twenty dollar bill.
The primary issue on appeal in this case is fairly simple.
With the exception of the question of actual damages, to be dealt
with under Issue II, there are no material disputed facts. In
dismissing most of the causes of action the trial judge made
reference to the correct standard of law.

But Summary Judgment

dismissing each of the Plaintiffs' eight separate causes of action
was entirely inappropriate in this case because the trial court,
rather than submit the case to a jury, substituted his own judgment
on the determining issues found in the grey area between fact and
law, often called mixed issues of fact and law.

It is a settled
9

principle that, in determining whether there are material disputed
facts, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Batchelor,
832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992)[emphasis added].
In granting Summary Judgment for the Defendants, the trial
court either completely ignored this principle, or determined that
in his own judgment, no reasonable jury could possibly rule in favor
of the Plaintiffs on any of their causes of action.

In ruling this

way, the trial court clearly erred, and thus this case should be
reversed and remanded.

In order to examine more particularly

precisely how the trial court erred in ruling as he did on each of
the Plaintiffs' causes of action, the following subsections of this
brief will examine the supporting facts and reasonable inferences
that might support a ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs on each of
their causes of action.
Wrongful Detention.
Wrongful Detention.

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is for

Wrongful detention is a civil cause of action,

based on the crime of unlawful detention.

The elements of the tort

of wrongful detention are found in Utah Code Annotated (1953) §76-5304(1) and are the knowing, unlawful, restraint of a person that
interferes substantially with his liberty.

The following undisputed

facts are in the record and would support a finding for the
Plaintiffs on this cause of action.
As stated in the undisputed facts section above, the
Plaintiffs, along with more than 35 of their co-workers, were
required by Defendant Esquivel, the factory manager, to leave their
10

work stations and gather in the factory cafeteria area, some thirty
feet from the closest door.

Then the Plaintiffs were informed that

because a co-worker had alleged the theft of a twenty dollar bill,
none of the workers would be permitted to leave the cafeteria area
until each worker had been personally searched by his or her
supervisor.

Defendant Esquivel informed the workers that they would

be required to enter the factory bathrooms one by one, where they
would be searched. (Bardales Deposition, p.23; Record p. 447).
Defendant Esquivel also stated that he knew that what he was
going to do was illegal, but that he didn't care.1

Finally,

Defendant Esquivel stated that if any of the workers wanted to
object, they could raise their hand, and then everyone would know
who the thief was.2
By virtue of his own admission to the workers, it has been
established that Esquivel knew his actions were illegal.

Therefore,

the specific remaining elements of the tort are those the trial
court focussed on in its Memorandum Decision (Record, pp. 685-696).3
Specifically, the trial court found that plaintiffs could not
prevail against the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because

Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p.
23; Record, pp. 452 and 439.
2

Record, pp. 439 and 447.

3

Although under normal circumstances citation to the
final Order would be more appropriate, where, as in this
case, that Order summarizes in three pages the trial court's
twelve page Memorandum Decision, examples of the trial
court's legal and factual reasoning will be taken from the
Memorandum Decision, as it is a more complete record.

11

they had not proven that defendants substantially interfered with
plaintiffs' liberty because the plaintiffs knew the location of an
exit and made no attempt to leave. (Record, p. 689).
The trial court held that as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs'
liberty was not substantially interfered with because they could
have walked out of the plant at any time.

However, the Utah statute

that provides the elements of the crime of unlawful detention, the
criminal parallel to the tort of wrongful detention, does not
require that there be no avenue of escape.4

Rather, it simply

requires that the Defendant substantially interfere with the
Plaintiffs' liberty to act on their own desires.

In this case a

reasonable presumption would be that the Plaintiffs' desired simply
to do the job they had been hired to do, and go home at the end of
the day.

Regardless of the fact that the defendants could possibly

have walked out of the factory at any time, a reasonable jury could
still find that the Defendants substantially interfered with the
Plaintiffs' liberty to do the job for which they were hired.
The trial court's holding that the Plaintiffs were not
wrongfully detained because they knew where the door was and did not

4

Although not controlling, the case of Orem City v.
Fillmore, (Case # 93 10 0350) is instructive regarding the
normal interpretation of this statute in criminal cases. In
that case, a Utah Fourth Circuit case involving the crime of
Unlawful Detention, the Defendant prevented someone else
from backing out of a parking space by intentionally placing
his car behind the parked car. Even though the individual
in the car was in no way prevented from getting out and
walking away, the Defendant was convicted of this crime on
June 7, 1993.
12

walk out of that door ignores the reasonable presumption, based both
on Esquivel's statements when he ordered the search and on the
previous threatening statements he had made to the factory workers
that, had the Plaintiffs chosen to walk out the door, their
employment with the factory would have been forfeit.
While unpleasant choices are a part of the daily life of most
human beings, the deliberate interference with someone else's right
of self determination requires some form of power over the other
person—whether that be physical power, economic power, or political
power.

Both criminal law and tort law are intended to protect

individuals from others who would use their power abusively.

The

basic elements of the abuse of power are codified in case law and in
statute.

However, at the most fundamental level, society at large

must determine what the words actually mean and what constitutes the
abuse of power.

For this reason the law has removed certain

determinations from the province of the judge, and given them to the
community, in the form of jurors.
The Defendants in this case arguably used the economic power
they had over the Plaintiffs to require them to leave their work
stations for over an hour, and enter the factory bathrooms one by
one to be searched.

Whether or not this use of the Defendants'

economic power constitutes an abuse of that power, sufficient to
substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' liberty, is a question
that must be determined by society, in the form of a jury.

The

trial court on this issue improperly held, as a matter of law, that
because the Plaintiffs could have escaped merely by sacrificing
13

their continued employment, the Defendants' actions did not
substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' liberty.
This determination by the trial court also implies, as a matter
of law, that the Defendants' use of their economic power over the
Plaintiffs did not, and cannot, legally constitute the tortious
abuse of power defined as Wrongful Detention.

Because the

Plaintiffs have established facts sufficient to support a finding by
society that the Defendants abused their economic power over them
and substantially interfered with their liberty, this cause of
action should be reversed and remanded for trial.
The defense has also argued that one cannot create a civil
cause of action from a crime.

This is simply not true.

law protects the interests of the society at large.
cases, the State is the prosecuting party.

Criminal

In criminal

As a result, the

standard of proof in a criminal case is always higher than that of a
civil case.5 However, criminal cases are brought on behalf of the
state, not the individual, and the general money damages available
to an individual in a civil case are not available in criminal
cases, where restitution is limited to actual costs incurred.6
Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the existence of a crime,
particularly an intentional crime, presupposes a parallel civil

See, for example, Privacy in the Workplace, Jon D.
Bible and Darien A. McWhirter, pp. 4-8 (Quorum Books,
Westport Conn.) 1990/ The American Law of Torts, Stuart M.
Speiser, Charles F. Krause, and Alfred W. Gans. (Clark,
Boardman, Callaghan, New York) 1991, §26:3.
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cause of action for general damages caused by the unlawful actions
of the defendants.
The trial courts' grant of summary judgment on this cause of
action should be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits
because there are issues regarding the reasonableness of the actions
of the parties, as well as issues regarding the reasonable meaning
of such terms as "substantial interference with liberty" that must
be determined by the trier of fact.
Assault.

The elements of a prima facie case for civil assault

are an act, made with the intention to inflict a harmful or
offensive contact, that places another in apprehension of an
immediate harmful or offensive contact. Restatement 2d. Torts, §21.
The interest that is protected by this cause of action is a purely
mental interest, and requires no evidence of actual damages.7
a.

Intent.

The Plaintiffs in this case have testified

that Defendant Esquivel, acting in his capacity as plant manager,
told an entire group of some forty employees that they could not
leave or return to their work stations until each of them had
entered the appropriate bathroom and been physically searched by

7

The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray. (Little, Brown & Co, Boston)
1986. Interference with the person, § 3.4.

their supervisor.8

Esquivel stated that he knew the search was

illegal, but that he didn't care..9
Mr. Esquivel has offered no testimony or other evidence
regarding his intent.
material fact.

Even if he had, this would be a disputed

In either case, the Plaintiffs' version of events

must, for purposes of deciding the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, be taken as true.
The fact that Esquivel stated that he knew the search was
illegal is prima facie evidence both that he knew a physical search
of their persons would be offensive to most normal people, and
further that he intended both the search and the apprehension of the
search, regardless of their offensiveness.
Defendant Esquivel's intent may also be reasonably inferred
from other circumstances of this case, discussed previously, such as
the relationship between the harm he was allegedly preventing, i.e.,
the stolen twenty dollar bill, and the action he took to remedy the
harm, as well as the likelihood of proving, even if one were found,
that a twenty dollar bill on the person of another factory worker
was the twenty dollar bill alleged to have been stolen.10

A jury

might well find on the facts of this case that the possibility of

8

Record, pp.419-457.

9

Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p.
23; Record, pp. 452 and 439.
10

See, for example, Plaintiff Semiday1s question
regarding how a twenty dollar bill in his wallet could be
distinguished from that allegedly stolen. Semiday
Deposition, pp. 40-41.
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resolving the theft by a physical search of all the factory workers
was so remote that Esquivelfs primary motivation and intent must
have been something entirely different.

That same jury might also

reasonably conclude that the twenty dollar bill was merely an excuse
for Esquivel to demonstrate his power as factory manager by forcing
everyone to submit to a search or lose their job.
This interpretation of the facts is further supported by the
fact that Esquivel apparently made no attempt to limit the search to
individuals with some proximity or ability to take the twenty
dollars.

For all of the above reasons, it would be more than

possible for a reasonable juror to find that, when he required the
plaintiffs and their co-workers to submit to a physical search,
Defendant Esquivel acted intentionally and deliberately to create in
the Plaintiffs and their co-workers the apprehension of an offensive
touching.

The Plaintiffs have further testified that Esquivelfs

action had that specific effect, and did indeed place them in
apprehension of an immediate offensive touching. (Record, pp. 419457) .
b. Reasonable Apprehension.

Defendants argued before the

trial court that the mere threat of an offensive contact is not
sufficient to permit a recovery.
of the law.

But this is a mischaracterization

The actual legal principle is more accurately stated as

follows:
Words do not make the actor liable for assault unless
together with other acts or circumstances they put the other in
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reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive
contact with his person.l:L
In this case, Defendant Esquivel had the actual ability, in his
capacity as plant manager, to compel each of the forty factory
workers to submit to this search or forfeit their employment.

He

further had the power to order the supervisors to search each of the
workers individually.

The fact that Esquivel had the present

ability to carry out his threat of an offensive contact, and
actually did proceed promptly to carry out his threat, resulting in
multiple offensive contacts, is sufficient to establish that the
Plaintiffs' apprehension of an offensive touching was reasonable.
The case law and the Restatement 2d Torts recognize a cause of
action for the right to be free of the apprehension of offensive
bodily contact.12 Again, the legal distinction is between a mere
threat and a threat coupled with the ability to carry out the threat
or some action evincing ability.

The present case clearly falls

inside the line dividing those two situations.

Because a reasonable

juror could find that the Defendants' action created in the
Plaintiffs a reasonable apprehension of an immediate offensive
contact with their persons, this cause of action must be remanded to
permit the jury to decide this issue.
Consent.

The trial court's decision on this and many, if

not all, of the Plaintiffs' other causes of action was based in part
on a further finding that, because there was no evidence that
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11

The American Law of Torts, supra, §26:16.

12

Id., §26:15.

defendants threatened plaintiffs with any violence or harm, no
reasonable juror could find that the Plaintiffs' submission to the
search was anything but consent, freely and voluntarily given.
Consent, where freely given, is an absolute defense to all
intentional torts.
However, consent comes in many forms.

It may be written, it

may be an express statement, it may be implied.
considerations apply to factual situation.
consent was neither express nor written.

Different legal

In the present case,

Therefore, both the

consent argued by the defendants and the consent found by the trial
court must be consent implied from the circumstances.

However, here

again the trial court invaded an area of factual determination
exclusively the jury's.

This is so because implied consent can only

be a factual determination derived from the totality of the
circumstances—i.e., based on all the other facts, the finder of
fact must determine whether the Defendants reasonably implied that
the Plaintiffs' consented.

Comment c to §892 of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts, (1977) explains:
If a reasonable person would not understand from the words or
conduct that consent is given, the other is not justified in
acting upon the assumption that consent is given even though he
honestly so believes; and there is no apparent consent. Id.
The trial court in the present case improperly invaded the province
of the jury in holding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs had
freely consented to remain and be searched.

Because none of the

Plaintiffs expressly consented, any consent must be implied from the
totality of the circumstances.

In a case that required a comparable
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determination of reasonableness in a negligence action, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Before the question of negligence [or, as in this case,
consent] becomes one of law, for the court, the facts shown by
the evidence must be such that all reasonable men must draw the
same conclusions from them. If the facts proven are such that
reasonable men may differ as to whether or not there was
negligence, [or consent], the question is one for the jury to
consider. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126, 129, (Utah
1967), 19 Utah 2d 292. [Comments added].
The undisputed facts of the present case must include consideration
of the totality of the evidence, including the previous history of
verbal abuse, the veiled threats Esquivel had raised previously
regarding the impact on their families of their unemployment, and
the possibility of being reported to the INS for deportation.

Given

those two threats in particular, it would not be impossible for a
reasonable juror to find that Esquivel's threats to the Plaintiffs'
economic well being and, in some cases, continued physical presence
in the U.S., coupled with Esquivel's apparent power to carry out
either or both threats, constituted duress, and that therefore the
Defendants could not reasonably assume that Plaintiffs' failure to
object meant, ipso facto, that they freely and willingly consented
to the search.
The issue of consent is, except in extraordinary cases, an
issue for the jury to decide.

This is not an extraordinary case,

precisely because the basic facts may be interpreted in more than
one way.

A jury might find that because none of the Plaintiffs

objected Defendants reasonably implied that they consented.
However, in determining whether consent is reasonably implied in any
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given set of circumstances, the

trier

of fact

is responsible for

determining whether consent was reasonably implied.

Restatement

§892.
Furthermore the trier of fact will also be required to
determine whether that implied consent was given under duress.
According to §892B of the Restatement, "duress is constraint of
another's will by which he is compelled to give consent when he is
not in reality willing to do so."

In determining the existence of

duress, the Restatement requires that the age, sex, mental capacity,
relation of the parties and any antecedent circumstances be
considered.

Again, it would be reasonable for a jury to find that,

given the power of Defendant Esquivel to fire the Plaintiffs at
will, given their limited job skills and the limited alternative
jobs available to them, and given Esquivelfs previous implicit
threats against any who might be illegal aliens, that the Plaintiffs
submitted to the search under duress, and did not, in fact, consent.
Battery:

The elements of a civil cause of action for battery

applicable to this case13 are the intentional infliction of a
harmful or offensive contact to the person of another.14

These

13

In order to simplify the issues, the complicated
phrasing of the hornbooks, intended to include cases of
transferred intent or intent merely to cause apprehension,
but not actual harm, has been deleted. It does not appear
that these additional elements contribute anything to the
present discussion, therefore they have been avoided where
possible.
14

See, for example, Restatement 2d. Torts §18/ Handbook
on the Law of Torts 5th Ed., William Prosser and Paige
Keeton, West Publishing Co. 1988, pp. 39, §9.
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elements have been explicitly testified to in at least two of the
searches.

The physical search of Rosa Mazariegos was full of

offensive contacts with her person, from the hands run around her
midriff to the pencil that was used to poke through her hair.
(Record, pp. 446-447).

Given, as has already been shown, that

Esquivel clearly intended, at a minimum, an illegal and presumably
offensive contact, all of the elements of a Battery are present.
This is also true in the case of Mr. Semiday, where the individual
conducting the search removed Mr. Semiday's shoes and socks.
(Semiday Deposition, p. 41). Furthermore, the search of the
remaining Plaintiffs' wallets, pockets, and other personal effects
may constitute a technical battery, where those personal effects are
shown to be connected to the Plaintiffs.
The trial court erred in dismissing this cause of action for
the same reasons previously discussed—i.e., the trial court found
as a matter of law that no reasonable juror could rule in favor of
the Plaintiffs on this issue.

The trial court dismissed this cause

of action in the same discussion and on the same grounds as he
dismissed the cause of action for assault.

Specifically, the trial

court found that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the
Plaintiffs because there was no evidence that defendants threatened
plaintiffs with any violence or harm and because there was no
evidence that defendant Esquivel intended the search of plaintiffs
to cause harmful or offensive contact.
The issues of consent, duress, and intent have been fully
discussed above, in the section on assault, and the same discussion
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is applicable here.

To summarize the argument briefly, a reasonable

jury could find for the Plaintiffs, on the grounds that either 1)
their consent to an offensive touching was not reasonably implied
under the circumstances, or that 2) any consent was obtained under
duress.

Furthermore, a reasonably jury could also find that

Esquivel clearly intended to cause an offensive contact to the
persons of the Plaintiffs where the search he ordered bore little or
no relationship to the theft it was allegedly intended to discover,
where the search had little or no likelihood of actually discovering
a thief, and where Esquivel clearly stated his intent to order the
search despite his awareness that it was illegal.
Because a reasonably jury could find for the Plaintiffs on the
facts of this matter, the trial court erred in dismissing the cause
of action for battery, rather than permitting it to be determined by
the jury.

For this reason, the Plaintiffs' cause of action for

battery must also be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.
False Imprisonment:

The elements of a prima facie case for

False Imprisonment under Utah law require that the Plaintiffs prove
at trial that:
By the exercise of force, or the express or implied threat of
force, [they were] compelled to remain where [they] do not wish
to remain or to go where [they] do not wish to go. The
essential thing is the restraint of the person. If the words
or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable apprehension of
force, and the means of coercion are at hand, a person may be
as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty as by prison
bars. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507,
(Utah) 1939.
In Hepworth, two individuals acting as floorwalkers for a
ballroom required two patrons to accompany them across the ballroom
23

floor to a room near the entrance of the ballroom.

There was no

evidence of force, other than the authority of the floorwalkers and
their police uniforms.

This case was tried to a jury, and the jury

found for the Plaintiff.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld

the verdict.
The Restatement 2d Torts uses different language to define the
tort of false imprisonment.

According to the Restatement, the

applicable elements of the tort of False Imprisonment are "an
action, intended to confine another within boundaries fixed by the
actor, a resulting confinement, and a conscious awareness of the
confinement." Restatement 2d Torts, §35.
Although the definition of the Hepworth court fits within the
Restatement definition, there is some variation in the terms used
that deserves discussion here.

In Hepworth the Utah Supreme Court

held that "the exercise of force,... or the express or implied
threat of force" was a required element of false imprisonment.

In

contrast, section §35 of the Restatement merely requires an action
with the intent to confine, and actual confinement.

Whether an "act

done with the intent to confine that results in actual confinement"
is the equivalent of the term "force," as used by the Utah Supreme
Court in Hepworth, is an issue of law.
It appears from the trial court's ruling in the present case
that he read Hepworth to require some display of actual physical
force, and that a verbal act, coupled with the power to cause actual
economic and other harm to the Plaintiffs was not a sufficient
threat to constitute actual or implied force.
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At best, this holding on the part of the trial court minimizes
the very real power that employers have over their employees in the
modern world.

At worst, this holding actually permits and

legitimizes the abuse of this power, by allowing employers such as
that in the present case, to act with impunity to require the
complete submission of their employees to every whim, regardless of
how unreasonable it may be.
The trial court in the present case held that because no actual
physical force was used to restrain them, Plaintiffs have no cause
of action for False Imprisonment, because they could have walked out
at any point.

This ruling ignores the fact that, had the

Plaintiffs gotten up and walked out of the factory rather than
submit to the search, they would effectively have terminated their
employment and subjected themselves to possible deportation.

It is

clear that under current Utah law, had the Plaintiffs walked out and
been terminated for refusing to submit to the search, they would
then have had a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.15

The question presented by this case,

however, is whether or not the individual must, without exception,
attempt the escape and suffer the consequences before having a legal
remedy for the Defendants' actions.

Such an absolute legal

principle is not in the public interest because it unfairly
penalizes those uneducated and unsophisticated employees who do not

15

See, for example, Berube, supra, where it was held
that forcing an employee to consent to a polygraph might
raise such a cause of action.
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know what their legal rights are until after those rights have been
abused.

Such a legal principle would require that in any set of

circumstances comparable to the present facts, an employee with
little or no knowledge of the law could lose all right to redress
merely by submitting, and waiting until later to consult with an
attorney.
The better rule is the reasonable man standard established by
the Restatement §36—that confinement may result from an act,
whether that act involves actual physical force or not, intended to
confine, that results in actual confinement.

The Restatement rule

would clearly not allow recovery in every case of non-physical
threat, but nor would it allow recovery in every case of physical
threat.

Instead, the Restatement rule would subject the issue of

actual confinement to a jury determination of reasonability.

More

specifically the Restatement would find a confinement where there
was no reasonable means of escape. Restatement §3 6. Furthermore,
the Restatement would require the trier of fact to determine whether
or not the Plaintiffs' refusal in any given case to get up and walk
out, was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
§36 of the Restatement defines what is reasonably required
under the circumstances in terms of a continuum between, on the one
hand, a means of escape of which the Plaintiffs were aware that only
entailed a slight inconvenience or the minor risk of nominal
liability, and, on the other hand, a means of escape that, under the
total circumstances would be "such as to make it offensive to a
reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity."Id.
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The undisputed facts of the present case are that Defendant
Esquivel was the plant manager; that Esquivel habitually verbally
harassed, intimidated, and threatened the factory workers. The
Plaintiffs have testified that Esquivel was angry when he ordered
the search.

They have further stated that he required them to

remain away from their normal work area, and that he required them,
one by one, to enter a bathroom and submit to a search.

Plaintiffs

have stated that the nearest exit was some thirty feet away, and
that it was closed. (Record, pp. 420-457).
The circumstances of this case would allow a jury to find in
favor of either position.

On the one hand, a jury might find that

getting up and walking out would have caused the Plaintiffs, even in
the event that they were fired, only a minor inconvenience, and that
therefore the Plaintiffs were not confined.
On the other hand, however, a reasonable jury might also find
a) that because any individual worker who sought to escape would
have had to walk a distance of some thirty feet from the cafeteria
area to the door, b) that because, given the distance, it was
impossible to tell whether the door had been locked, and whether
escape was a real, or merely illusory possibility, and that c)
because by getting up and walking out Plaintiffs would have
effectively been quitting their jobs, to require Plaintiffs to
escape in this manner was unreasonable.
The trial court ruled in this case that no reasonable jury
could find that the Plaintiffs were forced or compelled to remain in
the cafeteria area, and enter the factory bathrooms one by one to
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submit to the search of their persons.

The trial court also ruled

that Plaintiffs were not falsely imprisoned because, as a matter of
law, they had a reasonable means of escape.

But the trial court

erred in ruling absolutely that it would be impossible for a
reasonable jury to hold in the Plaintiffs' favor in this case.

The

facts of the present case are susceptible to more than one
interpretation.

Therefore, the issues of whether there was a

reasonable exit such that Plaintiffs were not confined, and of
whether Plaintiffs consented to remain or whether there was a
substantial threat of force such that Plaintiffs were compelled to
remain under duress, are questions for the jury to decide, not the
judge.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: According to the
Restatement, this is a comparatively new cause of action in tort.
However, it is one that the Utah courts have expressly recognized.16
The elements of this cause of action have been stated by the Utah
Supreme Court as the intentional causing of severe emotional
distress through extreme and outrageous conduct.
700.

Pentecost, Id., at

This definition was set forth in a case with facts analogous

to those of the instant case.
16

In Pentecost, a landlord's agent

See, for example, Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d
1238, (Utah App. 1989) Utah Court of Appeals held that
evidence was sufficient to present a jury question as to
whether Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah
1985), In reversing the lower court's grant of Summary
Judgment to the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court held that
material issues of fact existed as to whether a the self
help actions of a landlord's agent raised a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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resorted to self help, rather than legal process, in evicting the
Plaintiff and her children and seizing their personal belongings,
allegedly as compensation for non-payment of rent. As in the
present case, the agent's self-help remedies were illegal.
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) is
another Utah case that examines a summary judgement in favor of the
Defendant on a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that

evidence of emotional stress—Plaintiff's psychologist told her not
to return to work in her previous environment—and evidence that
Defendant's employees had "shadowed her movements, intimidated her
with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at
work in ways that made her job more stressful," was sufficient to
state a cause of action. _Id. In the present case, relatives of the
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits testifying to the emotional and
physical suffering caused the Plaintiffs by the Defendants'
behavior. (Record, pp. 420-436).

As causative actions, Plaintiffs

allege that Esquivel used his position and power as plant manager to
verbally and emotionally abuse Plaintiffs and to compel them to
submit to an unlawful search of their persons and possessions.
Another case that discusses the elements of this cause of
action is Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash
1977).

In that case, the Washington Supreme Court, En Banc,

determined that where a Mexican-American alleged that his employer
had permitted other employees to engaged in deliberate taunts,
slander, and racial epithets, and that this behavior on the part of

his employer and co-workers had caused him to suffer severe
emotional distress, due to the humiliations and public exposure to
scorn and ridicule, was sufficient to state a cause of action for
what Washington calls the Tort of Outrage.

This case is cited in

the Restatement 2d Torts §46, Definition of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress.

Contreras is, of course, not controlling in

Utah, but it is instructive, given the similarity of circumstances.
The trial court in the present case held, as a matter of law,
that no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants intended to
cause the plaintiffs emotional distress, nor that the Defendants
acted with reckless disregard to the probability of causing
emotional distress.

It is the Plaintiffs' position on appeal that

in so ruling the trial court clearly erred.

The Plaintiffs in the

present case have testified that Esquivel admitted that he knew his
actions were illegal.

Plaintiffs have also testified that the

Defendants almost exclusively hired Hispanic individuals with
limited English capability—arguably a more vulnerable workforce
than comparable U.S. citizens.

Plaintiffs have further testified

that Defendant Esquivel over a period of months verbally harassed,
threatened, and accused them of theft and other illegal actions,
including illegal entry into the U.S.

Plaintiff Mazariegos has

testified that the female supervisor who searched her picked through
her hair with a pencil, allegedly as part of a search for a twenty
dollar bill.

These undisputed facts, when combined with reasonable

inferences on the part of the Plaintiffs regarding the complete lack
of reasonable relationship between the alleged theft of an
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unidentifiable and unremarkable $20.00 bill, and the physical search
of forty factory employees, could well support a finding that
Defendants' sole intent in these circumstances was to humiliate the
Plaintiffs and the other workers.
The trial court's holding that, as a matter of law, no
reasonable jury could possibly find that the Defendants' conduct
constituted outrageous conduct is also clearly erroneous and must be
reversed.

The determination of what society considers to be

outrageous is, like previous issues discussed in this brief, a mixed
issue of law and fact.

Because reasonable men could differ on the

outrageousness of the Defendants' actions, in compelling nearly
forty Hispanic immigrant workers, legal and illegal, to submit to a
fruitless and baseless search of their persons and property, this is
yet another factual issue which must be determined by a jury.
Because the facts of the present case could support a jury
finding in favor of the Plaintiffs on their cause of action for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the trial court's
implicit holding that no reasonable juror could find in favor of the
Plaintiffs is clear error.

Therefore, the trial court's grant of

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this cause of action must
be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.
Invasion of Privacy.

The final three causes of action alleged

by the Plaintiffs all involve the specific area of privacy labeled
intrusion into private affairs.

In order to establish an invasion

of privacy claim of intrusion upon seclusion, a complaining party
must prove by preponderance of the evidence an intentional
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substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of the complaining party that would be highly offensive to
the reasonable person.17
Counts 7 & 8.

The first two claims for invasion of

privacy are based on the physical search of the Plaintiffs' persons
and personal possessions.

In granting summary judgement for the

Defendants on these causes of action, the trial court ruled that as
a matter of law the Defendants' search of the Plaintiffs' persons
and personal effects did not constitute an unreasonable intrusion
into their seclusion.

This statement of the trial court's holding

does not distinguish between the two possible legal rulings upon
which the holding might be based.

The first is the holding that, as

a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find that the physical
search of the persons and personal effects of the Plaintiffs in the
present matter was unreasonable or highly offensive.

The second is

the holding that, as a matter of law, no employee in Utah has any
reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical person and
personal effects while at their place of employment.
The first of these legal rulings is insufficient to support the
grant of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Like other issues

previously discussed in this brief, this legal holding depends on
the determination by the trial court of a mixed issue of law and
fact that is, except in extremely unusual circumstances, considered
the province of the jury.

17

Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d
62, 67 (Utah App. 1992).
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The language ^highly offensive to the reasonable person'
suggests a determination of fact for which a jury is uniquely
qualified.18
On the undisputed facts of the present case, for all of the reasons
discussed in previous sections of this brief, a jury could find that
the Defendants' actions, in restraining and physically searching the
Plaintiffs without probable, or even reasonable cause, were highly
offensive, and would have been to the reasonable person.

Thus, this

holding cannot support the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
The second of these holdings also purports to be a legal
principle.

But the only legal principle that would support the

trial court's failure to submit this case to a jury is the absolute
principle that, as a matter of law, no employee in the state of Utah
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical person and
personal effects while at their place of employment. Anything less
than an absolute ruling on this issue would require the matter to be
submitted to a jury for a determination of whether the Plaintiffs
had a reasonable expectation of privacy and seclusion in their
persons and personal effects, even while in the work place. Neither
this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever ruled directly on
such a case.

During the course of this appeal, this Court may

choose to adopt the standard applied by the trial court, and affirm
the trial court's dismissal of these two causes of action. However,
it is the Plaintiffs' position that such an absolute standard is
unnecessary and contrary to public policy.

Rather, the Plaintiffs

Turner, supra.
33

would argue that a more reasoned approach, and one more consistent
with previous Utah case law on this issue, is the position set forth
in

§652B of the Restatement.
The Restatement 2d Torts §652B, as cited in Cox v. Hatch, 761

P.2d 556 (Utah 1988), establishes a cause of action for unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another.

§652B defines the specific

elements of the tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion as: the intentional
intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns, where the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

There are two key

phrases in this definition: "intrusion, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns" and "highly offensive to a reasonable person."

The

second phrase concerns the standard which a jury must apply to
determine whether the parties' actions, given the undisputed facts,
were reasonable or unreasonable.

The first phrase contains two

elements of the legal cause of action for invasion of privacy, or
Intrusion upon Seclusion.

In the present case the first element,

an intrusion, is an undisputed fact.

Thus, the basis for the trial

court's ruling becomes the question of whether this

intrusion was

upon the solitude or seclusion of another.
In Cox, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
publication of photographs of the Plaintiffs, taken in a public
place at a public event, did not constitute an invasion of privacy
because the Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
such a situation.
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In the present case, the Defendants contend that

an actionable "intrusion into Plaintiffs' seclusion" is limited to
intrusion upon Plaintiffs in the privacy of their own homes or
automobiles.

But it is the Plaintiffs1 contention that, in

accordance with the Restatement §652B, the privacy rights of an
individual extend not merely to a dwelling or automobile, but also
to their physical persons and such personal effects as purses and
wallets.

Plaintiffs further contend that, without reasonable cause,

the subjection of these personal effects to physical search is an
actionable invasion of privacy.

The search in the present matter is

not comparable to a locker or desk search.

The Plaintiffs were

specifically told that they and their personal effects were going to
be physically searched.

Although the level of actual intrusion then

depended upon the supervisor doing the searching, the fact that some
were forced to submit to more invasive searches does not obviate the
fact that the privacy interests of each Plaintiff, in his or her
person and property, were invaded.
Privacy in the Workplace, supra, has an entire chapter devoted
to the legality of work place searches of employee's persons and
property.

The authors reach the conclusion, at the end of this

chapter, that
the legality of a search hinges essentially on the manner,
scope, justification and location of it. Searches of people
attract greater judicial scrutiny than inspections of places,
given the higher level of intrusiveness involved. . . . the
central issue usually boils down to whether the employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in question. Id.
p.169.
This position is supported by the Restatement,§652B,

where one of

the specific examples given to illustrate this cause of action is an
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illegal search of an individual's wallet.

This illustration is

directly on point in the present case.
As a matter of law, this Court must decide whether Plaintiffs'
persons and private affairs and concerns might reasonably be held to
be secluded under their clothing, and in their pockets, wallets,
purses, and lunch bags, or whether, on the contrary, no Utah
employee has any reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas
while at her place of employment.

If this Court holds that an

employee in Utah might reasonably have an expectation of privacy in
her person and personal effects, even while in the workplace, then
the trial court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on these causes of action must be reversed, and these
causes of action, along with the others, must be

remanded for a

jury to determine whether, on the actual facts of the present case,
the Plaintiffs' expectation of privacy in these areas was
reasonable, and whether, on the actual facts of the present case,
the Defendants' invasion of these areas would have been highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
Again, a jury might find that the Plaintiffs' alleged consent
will bar recovery on this cause of action.

On the other hand, as

with the causes of action previously discussed, a jury might also
find that Plaintiffs did not consent, and that the broad based,
coercive nature of the search, without reasonable cause, would
permit a recovery on this cause of action.
Count 9. The final cause of action is also one for
Invasion of Privacy, or Intrusion into the Personal Affairs of
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another.

Thus, the same elements, of an unreasonable or highly

offensive

intrusion into an area where one has a reasonable

expectation of privacy, must be established.

The factual basis for

this final cause of action differ from that of the previous causes
of action.

However, the material facts are again undisputed.

As

stated above, it is an undisputed fact that, during Plaintiff
Semiday's first employment interview with the Defendant company,
Defendant Esquivel requested, as a purported condition of
employment, that Semiday show him his LDS temple recommend.

As a

matter of public policy, Federal and State anti-discrimination
statutes stand, in part, for the principle that the employment
decisions of businesses, with the exception of a limited category of
religiously owned and operated businesses, should not be made on the
basis of the prospective employee's religious affiliation or
standing.

This is true even where the business is discriminating in

favor of a specific category, and thus an individual would have no
legal cause of action under either of those laws.

Because this is a

matter of public policy, this Court should hold herein that, as a
matter of law, all Utah employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the workplace regarding their religious standing and
status.

While an employee may choose, during the course of

employment, to reveal certain facts, this choice should, as a matter
of law, remain the employee's, not the employer's.
Because Utah employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the workplace regarding their religious standing and status, and
because, as in the previous two causes of action, the fact of an
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intrusion is uncontested, the remaining issues for this Court to
determine are 1) whether a jury might reasonably find that the
Defendant's intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and thus unreasonable, and 2) whether a jury might
reasonably find that Defendant's intrusion was not protected by
consent on the part of Plaintiff Semiday.
It is important, in determining whether a reasonable person
might find the Defendant's intrusion highly offensive, to note that
the fact that an LDS church member does or does not have a temple
recommend is indicative of even more personal, intensely private
facts, than the simple question may indicate. An answer to that
question provides an employer with information regarding sexual
habits, smoking and drinking habits, the individual's financial
affairs, and involvement with the LDS Church.

A reasonable person

might consider any or all of these areas deeply private and
personal; because this is the case, a reasonable person might also
find that a strange employer's intrusion into this area of a
prospective employee's personal life was highly offensive and thus
unreasonable.
The last factor which must be determined in deciding whether
the trial court's ruling on this cause of action was appropriate is
the issue of consent. Although the facts underlying this last cause
of action are different from the facts underlying each of the
previous causes of action, the issue of consent involves some
parallel considerations. As in each of those causes of action, the
basic facts may be interpreted in more than one way.
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A jury might

find that Semiday's failure to immediately object to this request on
the part of his prospective employer, and his actions in taking out
the recommend and giving it to the Defendant, are reasonably
interpreted as freely given consent.

But because Semiday did not

expressly consent to this violation of his legal rights, his consent
must be implied from the totality of the circumstances. Restatement
2d Torts §892. Therefore, a jury might also find that, given the
employment interview setting, the relative power of the parties,
Semiday's lack of legal knowledge and sophistication and his
dependence upon the good will of this prospective employer, it would
be unreasonable for that employer to believe, merely because the
prospective employee failed to object,

that the employee freely

consented to this intrusion into his personal affairs.
Because the facts of this matter establish a cognizable claim
for invasion of privacy, in that 1) a jury could reasonably find
that the Defendant intruded unreasonably into an area of Plaintiff's
personal affairs where 2) he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and that 3) this intrusion would be highly offensive to the
reasonable person, and that 4) the Defendant, given the totality of
the circumstances, could not reasonably infer that the Plaintiff
freely consented to this invasion of his privacy,

the trial court

erred in holding as a matter of law that Summary Judgment for the
Defendants was appropriate.

Because reasonable minds could find in

favor of the Plaintiff on this cause of action, Summary Judgment on
this cause of action must also be reversed and remanded for trial on
the merits.
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ISSUE II, Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter
of law that because Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence
of damages of monetary or emotional damages, Defendants were
entitled to Summary Judgment, where 1) the Plaintiffs had
submitted their own and the affidavits of family members as
evidence of actual emotional damages, as well as 2) the Report
of one Expert Witness and the Affidavit of another, and where
3) the causes of action alleged were for the intentional torts
of wrongful detention, assault, battery, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of
privacy•
The issue of the Plaintiffs' ability to prove actual damages in
this case was a significant factor in the trial court's ruling that
as a matter of law Plaintiffs had failed to state a legally
sufficient cause of action on any of their claims.

Specifically, at

oral argument on this Motion the trial court expressed several times
his concern that Plaintiffs had no actual evidence of damages,
despite the affidavits of the Plaintiffs and their family members,
submitted in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.19

Because this was such a significant concern, the trial

court delayed ruling on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
for several months, and requested that Plaintiffs obtain and submit
to the trial court actual evidence of their damages, in order to
permit the trial court to rule in their favor. (Record, pp. 785787) .
Finally, both the Order prepared by the Defendants and the
trial court's own Memorandum Decision cite the alleged failure of
the Plaintiffs to provide any evidence of damages as a basis for
Granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on each of

Record, pp. 420-457.
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Plaintiffs' causes of action.20

In addition to all the purported

legal reasons previously discussed as justification and support for
the trial court's ruling in favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the trial court expressly stated in its Memorandum
Decision that "lacking any evidence that plaintiffs have incurred
any monetary or psychological damages resulting from the search
conducted by defendants, the Court finds the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against defendants."(Record, pp. 685-686).
This ruling of the trial court's is so clearly erroneous on so
many different grounds as to be ludicrous.
is factually wrong.

First, the trial court

Second, the trial court is legally wrong on

l)the legal admissibility of Plaintiffs' testimony regarding
emotional damages; 2) the legal admissibility of Plaintiffs' Expert
Witnesses Report; 3) the legal standard of evidence required, both
as a) pertains to Plaintiffs' burden of proof on this issue in the
present Motion for Summary Judgment and b) as pertains to proof of
compensatory and general damages sufficient to permit recovery under
the alleged causes of action; and finally, 4) the trial court
ignores the settled law that a Plaintiff who states a prima facie
case for an intentional tort such as Assault, Battery, False
Imprisonment, or Invasion of Privacy may, even where there are no
actual damages, recover nominal damages for the simple violation of
a legally protected interest.

See Hearing Transcript, February 10, 1995, Record, pp.
782-783; 781-782; Order, Record, p. 701; Memorandum
Decision, Record, pp. 687-685.

Trial Court's Ruling is Factually Wrong.

The trial court's

ruling that Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence to support their
monetary and psychological/emotional damages is simply factually
wrong.

In support of their Objection to Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs filed, on November 1, 1994, eight
affidavits.

Each of these eight affidavits testifies to the

emotional and/or physical devastation caused by the Defendants'
actions.

Plaintiffs and their families testified that as a direct

result of the search to which they were subjected, the Plaintiffs
suffered humiliation, embarrassment, extreme anxiety, depression,
and a general sense of powerlessness.

Three of these affidavits

testify implicitly to actual monetary damages resulting from one
Plaintiff's near nervous breakdown, caused by the search to which
the Defendants subjected her, that directly resulted in her complete
emotional inability to seek new employment for a period of months.
Trial Court's Ruling is Legally Wrong.
Plaintiffs' Affidavits are Legally Admissible.

In

the face of this testimony, the Defendants argued that the
Plaintiffs' supplemental affidavits were inadmissible because they
were submitted after the Plaintiffs' Depositions had been taken.
The Defendants further alleged in their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Affidavits that the Affidavits were inadmissible because they
contradicted the Deposition testimony.

But despite the fact that

the Defendants filed their Motion to Strike some five months after
they received the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affidavits, the Defendants
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did not ever cite a single example of such a contradiction.21

In fact, the Defendants

themselves state that "[the Affidavits] are an attempt to expand
from the sole issue related to the checking or searching to one of
general allegation of rude and disrespectful treatment in the work
place." (Record, p. 626, emphasis added).

And "in her Affidavit,

Rosa Mazariegos, attempting to expand her damages well beyond what
she stated in her Deposition. . ." (Record, p. 625, emphasis added).
Affidavits offered to expand on Deposition testimony, where such
expansions do not materially contradict the Deposition testimony are
not inadmissable.
All of these issues, however, were raised and addressed in the
Defendants' Motion to Strike and/or Disregard, and the Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to that Motion.

However, although the

trail court apparently did disregard the Plaintiffs' affidavit
testimony regarding the damages they suffered, as a matter of
procedure the trial court declined to rule on the Defendants' Motion
to Strike.(Record, p.685).

Therefore, as a factual matter, this

testimony remains in the record in support of Plaintiffs' opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
But, regardless of whether Plaintiffs' Affidavit testimony
remained in the record, the trial court did not cite, discuss, or in
any other way appear to have considered these Affidavits as valid
evidentiary testimony when it held that Plaintiffs had submitted no
evidence to support any possible damage claim.

Because the trial

21

Record, pp. 621-628; see also pp. 655-654; pp. 674675; pp. 641-658; and pp. 621-628.
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court did not rule on the Defendants' Motion to Strike, there is no
express explanation for the courts' disregard of this evidence.

But

a statement the trial court made at oral argument may provide some
explanation for the court's failure to consider this evidence.
Specifically, the court stated:
But I can tell you, your people thoughts and feelings that are
not appropriate for Cross Examination and may not even be
admitted into evidence. It may not even get to a question on
those [sic] .22
If this is indeed the trial court's justification for ignoring the
factual testimony regarding emotional damages, the court errs in
believing that Plaintiffs' testimony regarding their thoughts and
feelings is inadmissible.

More specifically, this statement is

untenable as a statement of legal principle where, as in every single one
of Plaintiffs'eight separate causes of action, an actionable element of either the
specific tort or of resulting general damages is specifically a
mental or emotional harm.

Where a tort is either intended in full or in

part to protect individuals from mental or emotional damage, or
where an element of the prima facie case concerns a particular
mental state, testimony regarding the Plaintiffs' mental thoughts
and feelings is admissible, highly relevant, and probative.23
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Report & Affidavit Legally
Admissible.

Even assuming, strictly for the sake of this argument,

that the trial court was correct in ignoring the Plaintiffs'
22
23

Record, p. 786.

See, e.g., Boies v. Raynor, 361 P.2d 1, 3, 89 Ariz.
257 (Ariz. 1961).
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affidavit testimony for one reason or another, the Plaintiffs also
submitted, as evidence in support of their emotional damages, the
Report of Dr. Juan Mejia and the Affidavit of Dr. Linda Gummow.
This evidence alone should be sufficient to establish an issue
regarding the factual existence of actual damages. However, the
trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, ruled as a matter of law
that Dr. Mejia's report was inadmissible.

The trial court stated

that Dr. Mejia's report was inadmissible a) because it was not
submitted in affidavit form and therefore must be considered
hearsay, and b) because the report cannot be admitted into evidence
as a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(4) as an exception to the hearsay rule
because the evaluation by Dr. Mejia was performed solely to aid the
pursuit of litigation, nor for the purpose of diagnosis to promote
treatment.
Solely for the practical purposes of this appeal, Plaintiffs
will not challenge the legal validity of the first of these rulings,
although as a practical matter, this report was submitted in direct
response to the trial court's request for examples of precisely how
Plaintiffs intended to prove their factual damages at trial.
Because, had this matter gone to trial, Dr. Mejia would have been
available to provide the necessary foundation to establish the
admissibility of this report, the trial court's refusal to consider
it as evidence even of what Plaintiffs might prove at trial seems
contrary to Utah Rule of Evidence 102, which states that:
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These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.
However, even if Dr. Mejia's Evaluation Report is hearsay, it is
still admissible as evidence in this matter, despite the fact that
it was prepared solely to aid the pursuit of litigation.

This is

because the trial court interprets incorrectly Utah Rule of Evidence
803(4).

Contrary to the trial court's actual holding, Utah Rule of

Evidence 803(4) does not bar a psychological report that is
prepared, whether to aid in the pursuit of litigation or not, "for
purposes of medical [or psychological] diagnosis or treatment."24
In fact, this rule was specifically adopted specifically to avoid
the result that occurred in this case below.

According to the

advisory committee notes:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay
exception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness,
statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of
enabling him to testify. While these statements were not
admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to
state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this
kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to
be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the
limitation.25
Because Dr. Mejia's evaluation does provide actual diagnoses of the
emotional and psychological damage the Plaintiffs' suffered at the

24

See, e.g., State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222
(Utah 1986); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir.
1988); U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985).
25

Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, 28
U.S.C.A. Rule 803, at 279 (West 1984); cited in State v.
Schreuder, supra, at 1223.
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time their causes of action arose, this report falls into the
exception established by Utah Rule of Evidence 803(4) to the general
rule that hearsay is inadmissible.

Therefore, the trial court erred

in ruling it inadmissible and refusing to consider it as evidence of
Plaintiffs' actual damages.

Because the trial court ruled that the

affidavit of Plaintiffs' second expert witness was inadmissible
solely because it was based on Dr. Mejia's Report, this affidavit is
also admissible as evidence of Plaintiffs' damages.
The trial court further erred in ruling as a matter of law that
the Plaintiffs, without expert witness testimony, could not
establish emotional damages sufficient to sustain any of their
causes of action.

This ruling, reduced to its essence, produces a

completely absurd result—basically, this holding would bar any
plaintiff who could not afford to obtain professional treatment from
ever recovering damages for emotional suffering and harm.
Expert Witness Testimony not Required to Prevail against
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Fortunately, proof of emotional

damages does not, as an absolute rule of law, require the testimony
of an expert witness.

This is particularly true where, as in the

present case, the issue of damages arises in the context of a Motion
for Summary Judgment.

In ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment,

it is not the province of the trial court to assess the sufficiency
of the evidence.26

Where, as in the present case, the material

facts are uncontroverted, the trial court must assume for the

Singleton, supra, at 128.
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purpose of determining the Motion, that the party opposing the
Motion has sufficiently proven its alleged facts, and that, unless
the moving party is, on those fact, entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.27
Therefore, the trial court erred in the present case when he ruled
that only expert witness testimony of damages would be sufficient to
prevent a ruling for the Defendants on their Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Where the Defendants, as the party moving for Summary

Judgment, had failed to submit any sworn testimony in contradiction
to Plaintiffs' Affidavits and the Report and Affidavit of their
Expert Witnesses, the trial court's findings that there were no
material disputed facts regarding the existence of damages, and that
damages did not exist, were clearly in violation of all standard
practice and procedure with regard to Motions for Summary
Judgment.28
Plaintiffs' Causes of Action do Not Require Expert Witness
Testimony to Recover Damages.

Even if this issue had arisen in

another context, the law would not have supported a blanket
dismissal of each of the Plaintiffs' eight separate causes of action
merely because there was no expert witness testimony to support an
award for emotional damages.

27

See,
158 (Utah
P.2d 950,
Nat. Res.
28
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This is so for two reasons. First,

e.g., TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156,
App. 1994); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
957 (Utah App. 1989); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Co., 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1981).

Record, p. 686.

because no reasonable jury could find in their favor on any of their
eight causes of action.

In so ruling the trial court made

impermissible factual determinations regarding the sufficiency of
the evidence and regarding the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the facts in areas of mixed law and fact that are traditionally
the responsibility of the jury to decide.
Furthermore, the trial court erred both on the facts and on the
law in holding that Defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment as
a matter of law because Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence
sufficient to support an award of damages on any of their eight
causes of action.
Because the trial court erred on these issues, and because the
undisputed facts are sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a
ruling by a jury in Plaintiffs' favor on each of their causes of
action, this entire case must be reversed and remanded for trial on
the merits.

.

y

DATED this L6th day of January, 1996.

iTTTL.

JONES

Attorney fox Plaintiffs
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some of Plaintiffs' causes of action do not require expert witness
testimony to establish damages. For example:
In a civil action to recover damages for assault and battery,
any evidence that will fairly show the nature and extent of the
injuries received and the pecuniary loss suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of such injuries is generally admissible.
Assault and Battery, 6 Am Jur 2d, §218.29
Secondly, some or all of Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action do not
require proof of any damages whatsoever in order to recover nominal
damages .30
In conclusion, the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiffs
had failed to provide any evidence of emotional or pecuniary damage
and that the testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses was
inadmissible.

The trial court also erred in holding as a matter of

law that Plaintiffs could recover no damages, nominal or
compensatory, on any of their eight causes of action, simply because
they allegedly failed to offer expert witness testimony in
opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

As a matter of both

fact and law, the trial court's holding on this issue is clearly
erroneous and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in ruling on the undisputed facts that
Defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law

29

See also, Hepworth, supra, at 510.

30

See, e.g., Hepworth, id; Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P.
429, 431 (Utah 1916), 47 Utah 536; Marshall v. District of
Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. App. 1978); Sutherland
v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716, 724 (W.Va. 1959); Aquino v.
Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 426 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1959); Lacey
v. Laird, 139 N.E. 2d 25, 31 (Ohio 1956) 166 Ohio St. 12.
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